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Abstract	
This	article	considers	the	deepening	of	police	power	in	the	criminal	law	of	New	South	Wales	
(NSW),	Australia.	It	analyses	the	combined	effects	of	four	recent	criminal	law	regimes	that	
not	 only	 give	 the	 NSW	 Police	 Force	more	 powers,	 but	 also	 reflect	 the	 significant	 role	 of	
institutional	 police	 power	 and	 the	 pre‐emptive	 logic	 of	 criminal	 law.	 We	 examine:	 the	
introduction	of	 serious	 crime	prevention	 orders;	 the	 introduction	of	 public	 safety	 orders;	
investigative	detention	powers	in	relation	to	terrorist	acts;	and	confiscation,	forfeiture	and	
search	powers,	 and	 trespass	offences	 that	 target	protests.	Drawing	on	 the	work	of	 ‘police	
power’	theorists,	we	argue	that	these	new	regimes	illustrate	the	centrality	of	police	power	to	
the	criminal	law	rather	than	a	deviation	from	a	putative,	‘normal’	criminal	law.	
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Introduction	
This	article	considers	recent	extensions	to	police	power	in	the	criminal	law	of	New	South	Wales	
(NSW),	Australia.	It	analyses	the	combined	effects	of	four	new	criminal	law	regimes	that	give	the	
NSW	Police	Force	more	powers,	deepen	institutional	police	power	and	extend	the	pre‐emptive	
reach	 of	 criminal	 law	 to	 govern	 apparent	 threats	 to	 social	 order.	We	 examine:	 serious	 crime	
prevention	orders,	introduced	by	the	Crimes	(Serious	Crime	Prevention	Orders)	Act	2016	(NSW);	
public	 safety	orders,	 introduced	by	 the	Criminal	Legislation	Amendment	 (Organised	Crime	and	
Public	Safety)	Act	2016	 (NSW);	 investigative	detention	of	 terrorist	suspects,	 introduced	by	the	
Terrorism	 (Police	 Powers)	 Amendment	 (Investigative	 Detention)	 Act	 2016	 (NSW);	 and	 new	
confiscation,	forfeiture	and	search	powers,	and	trespass	offences	that	target	protests,	introduced	
by	 the	 Inclosed	Lands,	Crimes	and	Law	Enforcement	Legislation	Amendment	 (Interference)	Act	
2016	(NSW).		
	
The	predominant	critique	of	these	new	regimes	characterises	them	as	dangerous	because	they	
are	‘outside’	the	normal	criminal	law,	or	because	they	create	(police)	justice	systems	‘parallel’	to	
the	criminal	 law	(NSW	Bar	Association	2016).	These	are	powerful	arguments,	especially	when	
raised	by	legal	professionals	working	within	the	criminal	law.	But,	rather	than	beginning	with	the	
assumption	that	the	new	legislation	has	features	that	are	epiphenomenal	or	alien	to	criminal	law,	
our	aim	is	to	consider	how	the	provisions	reflect	and	shape	the	relationship	between	police	power	
and	criminal	law.		
	
Analysing	the	combined	features	and	effects	of	these	new	regimes	in	NSW	clarifies	how	criminal	
law	and	criminal	process	function	through	the	power	to	police.	We	outline	some	of	the	features	
of	 these	 laws	 that	 shape	 the	police	power	as	one	operative	 logic	of	 the	criminal	 law,	and	one	
source	of	its	authority.	We	suggest	that	the	blurring	of	categories	of	public	order/organised	crime	
and	 suspect/convicted	 offender	 that	 is	 evident	 across	 the	 new	 legislation	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	
criminal	 law’s	 power	 to	 police.	 In	 understanding	 these	 combined	 laws	 as	 police	 power,	 we	
analyse	protest	together	with	‘serious	crime’,	and	‘ordinary	suspects’	with	terrorists.	This	method	
not	 only	 finds	 new	 hybrid	 categories	 of	 offender	 but	 also	 diagnoses	 over‐reach.	 Our	 aim	 in	
locating	criminal	law’s	power	to	police	is	also	to	de‐centre	the	received	categories	of	criminal	law	
as	it	has	been	traditionally	conceived.	
	
This	article	begins	by	setting	out	our	understanding	of	 the	criminal	 law	as	 the	exercise	of	 the	
state’s	police	power	as	an	expansive,	pre‐emptive	governance	also	grounded	in	the	legitimacy	of	
legality	and	due	process.	The	next	section	outlines	some	political	context	 in	which	 these	 laws	
were	passed	to	draw	attention	to	the	earlier	amplifications	of	police	power	that	preceded	them,	
before	overviewing	the	rationale	for	each	law.	We	then	thematically	address	the	combined	effects	
of	 the	 laws	 in	 furthering	 four	 specific	 features	 of	 police	 power:	 the	 expansion	 of	 target	
populations;	the	expanding	concepts	of	risk	and	potential	harm;	the	transfer	of	judicial	to	police	
power;	and	the	expanded	punitive	dimensions	to	policing.	The	article	concludes	by	considering	
the	conceptual	utility	of	these	features	in	understanding	the	police	power	function	of	the	criminal	
law.		
	
Conceptualising	the	police	power	of	the	criminal	law	
The	relationship	between	police	power	and	criminal	 law	raises	a	set	of	questions	about	what	
police	power	is,	where	police	power	can	be	located,	and	to	what	end.	However,	police	power	has	
been	 marginalised	 or	 ‘residual’	 in	 the	 study	 of	 criminal	 law	 (Dubber	 2006;	 Farmer	 2006;	
Neocleous	 2000,	 2006).	 Criminal	 law	 is	 conventionally	 understood	 as	 separate	 from	 police	
powers	and	policing,	with	the	latter	limited	to	a	study	of	police	institutions.	A	result	of	confining	
policing	to	the	institution	of	the	police	force	is	that	a	conception	of	police	power	as	the	diverse	
sources	of	authority	to	regulate	the	population	is	lost	(see	Dubber	and	Valverde	2006).	At	best,	
police	powers	extend	to	the	study	of	criminal	law	as	its	‘process’	rather	than	integral	to	criminal	
laws	categories,	operations	and	effects.	The	origins	of	the	marginalisation	of	police	power	in	the	
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study	of	criminal	law	lie	in	the	conventional	framing	of	Police	and	law	as	the	separation	between	
administrative	 and	 judicial	 power	 respectively	 (Neocleous	 2000).	 Critical	 analyses	 of	 the	 law	
making	 power	 (McBarnett	 1981)	 or	 the	 ‘quasi‐judicial’	 (Neocleous	 2000:	 105)	 or	 sovereign	
power	of	policing	(Hardt	and	Negri	2000)	have	provided	important	correctives	to	one	half	of	this	
dichotomy.	Challenges	 to	 the	prevailing	 idea	of	 criminal	 law	as	a	purely	moral‐juridical	order	
rather	than	the	state’s	power	to	police	are	shortly	considered.		
	
First,	we	provide	a	note	on	terminology.	We	use	‘police	power’	in	this	article	in	two	senses:	first,	
to	refer	to	the	institutional	and	political	power	of	the	NSW	Police	Force	in	shaping	criminal	justice	
agendas;	and,	second,	to	highlight	that	power	to	police	was	the	foundation	of	the	criminal	 law	
(the	greater	focus	of	the	article).	We	draw	on	a	small	body	of	critical	policing	literature,	which	
challenges	 the	 dominant	 framework	 regarding	 Police	 and	 law,	 to	 distinguish	 between	 ‘police	
powers’	and	‘the	police	power’.	We	consider	these	concepts	in	relation	to	each	other.	
	
By	‘police	powers’,	we	refer	to	the	broad	range	of	legal	and	political	authority	conferred	on	the	
NSW	Police	 Force	 to	 act	 on	behalf	 of	 the	 state,	 including	powers	 under	 the	Law	Enforcement	
(Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	2002	(LEPRA	2002)	(NSW),	policies	and	regulatory	frameworks	
(for	example,	 in	 the	Police	Act	1990	 (NSW)),	and	criminal	 law	offences.	This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	
police	powers	are	for	law	enforcement	alone	or	derive	their	authority	solely	from	law;	rather,	our	
approach	acknowledges	the	productive	nature	of	police	powers	in	constructing	state	authority	
and	social	orders	in	particular	places	and	times	(Dixon	1997;	Neocleous	2000).	
	
In	an	influential	characterisation,	Dubber	(2006:	107)	sets	out	a	theory	of	criminal	law	as	police	
power,	what	he	calls	‘the	police	power	model	of	the	criminal	process’.	In	brief,	‘the	police	power’	
is	the	power	of	the	state	over	its	population	to	keep	the	public	peace.	The	police	power	function	
of	the	criminal	law	is	‘the	identification	and	elimination	of	criminal	threats	to	the	state’,	not	social	
harms	to	persons	(Dubber	2006:	134).	Dubber	(2006:	118)	maintains	that	 ‘criminal	 law	in	 its	
entirety	derives	 from	the	state’s	power	 to	police;	a	crime	 is	a	crime	 insofar	as	 it	breaches	 the	
peace’.	In	this	register,	‘…	every	offence	in	the	end	is	a	police	offence,	not	just	those	traditionally	
categorised	as	such	[emphasis	in	original]’	(Dubber	2006:	118;	see	also	Dixon	1997).	Dubber	is	
attentive	to	‘those	features	of	the	criminal	law	and	process	as	a	whole	that	reflect	its	foundation	
in	 the	 power	 to	 police’	 (Dubber	 2006:	 108).	 These	 key	 features	 include:	 the	 creation	 of	
‘offenderless	offences’	where	implicit	status	offences	replace	traditional	conduct	and	mens	rea	
offences,	 and	where	 the	only	victim	 is	 the	state;	 a	 focus	on	 incapacitation	as	 the	 rationale	 for	
criminal	 laws	 intervention;	 and	 a	 reliance	 on	 inchoate	 offences	 like	 attempt,	 conspiracy,	
facilitation.	 These	 features	 of	 the	 police	 power	 enable	 criminal	 law	 to	 act	 upon	 a	 person’s	
‘criminal	 character’	 rather	 than	 any	 behaviour	 resembling	 the	 elements	 of	 a	 criminal	 offence	
(Dubber	2006:	128‐136).	
	
In	a	related	 inquiry,	Farmer’s	 (2006:	147)	 thesis	 is	 that	modern	 jurisprudence	should	 include	
police	power	because	much	of	the	English	state’s	power	to	police	was	juridified	as	the	criminal	
law	in	the	early	nineteenth	century	and	propelled	by	the	birth	of	the	modern	police	force.	As	a	
result,	 prevention	 and	 deterrence	have	been	 significant	 organising	 logics	 in	 the	 criminal	 law,	
which	underpinned	the	exercise	of	 the	criminal	 law	from	that	 time	(Farmer	2006).	Foucault’s	
work	in	charting	the	debates	on	the	origins	of	prevention	in	criminal	law	has	a	corrective	role	in	
allaying	the	 idea	that	prevention	belongs	 to	a	police	 force	and	 is	alien	to	criminal	 law	(Sentas	
2014:	78‐81).	In	his	1977	essay,	The	Dangerous	Individual,	Foucault	(1990)	followed	the	debates	
between	criminal	anthropologists	and	the	International	Association	for	Penal	Law	in	the	1890s	
on	the	proper	function	of	risk	in	the	criminal	law	in	order	to	incapacitate	‘dangerous	individuals’.	
The	 criminologists	 wanted	 to	 put	 aside	 legality	 by	 abandoning	 the	 notion	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 in	 favour	 of	 assessing	 the	 level	 of	 risk	 an	 individual	 posed	 to	 society.	 They	
advocated	that	the	criminal	law	was	for	the	‘defence	of	society’	rather	than	as	a	mechanism	of	
punishment	flowing	from	an	individual’s	intent	to	do	harm.	In	this	view,	the	role	of	the	criminal	
law	was	 to	 respond	to	 the	dangerousness	of	 the	subject,	not	whether	 that	subject	was	 legally	
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responsible.	At	the	time,	this	was	successfully	resisted	by	the	criminal	lawyers	as	anathema	to	the	
rule	of	law.	However,	Foucault	maps	how	the	criminology	of	risk	prevailed	in	the	criminal	law	in	
subtler	forms,	arguing	criminal	law	practice	and	its	legal	determinations	were	structured	by	the	
‘psycho‐social	hegemony’	of	delinquency	(Foucault	1990:	145).	The	incorporation	of	disciplinary	
knowledge	in	penality	(forensic	science,	psychology,	criminology)	gradually	transformed	the	idea	
of	the	harmful	act	into	the	potential	danger	inherent	in	the	individual.	The	concept	of	legality	in	
practice	thus	shifted	from	acting	on	the	crime	to	acting	on	the	criminal	(Foucault	1990:	144).		
	
In	liberal	philosophy,	the	law	creates	the	rational	grounds	for	criminalisation	according	to	what	
one	 does.	 In	 liberal	 understandings	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 law	 and	 policing,	 the	 Police	
prevent	social	risks	presented	by	risky	subjects	by	responding	to	how	the	individual	violates	the	
law,	or	might	do	so	in	the	future.	Understanding	the	police	power	as	a	rationale	of	the	criminal	
law	is	essential	to	criminal	law	as	a	mode	of	state	regulation	or	governance	aimed	at	securing	or	
‘civilising’	order	(Farmer	2016).	The	police	power	is	characterised	not	by	categorical	prevention,	
but	the	discretion	to	choose	whatever	measures	are	best	suited	to	maintaining	a	particular	social	
order	 (Dubber	2006).	 Importantly,	Dubber	argues	 the	police	power	mode	of	 the	criminal	 law	
coexists	with	other	forms	of	state	authority,	particularly	the	‘due	process’	model	of	the	criminal	
law	based	on	its	autonomy.	Through	the	ideology	of	autonomy	(legality),	the	police	power	model	
drives	the	reality	of	the	criminal	process,	where	the	object	 is	to	disrupt	and	incapacitate	risky	
subjects	or	future	crimes.		
	
The	 coexistence	 of	 multiple	 sources	 of	 authority	 for	 the	 criminal	 law	 underscores	 tensions	
between	the	criminal	law	deriving	legitimacy	through	prevention	and	efficiency	through	acting	
upon	 future	 threats,	 whilst	 simultaneously	 being	 institutionally	 grounded	 in	 acting	 on	 past	
actions	and	principles	of	legality.	A	large	body	of	literature	on	the	sustained	‘preventive	turn’	of	
the	criminal	law	over	the	last	two	decades	(Ashworth	and	Zedner	2014;	Zedner	2009)	suggests	
an	 incompatibility	 between	 prevention/pre‐emption	 and	 criminal	 law	 principles	 or,	
alternatively,	 that	 the	 justificatory	norms	of	 the	criminal	 law	have	been	eroded.	Whilst	others	
point	 to	how	the	operation	of	 the	criminal	 law	on	risk	and	 future	threats	 is	neither	novel	nor	
exceptional,	our	greater	interest	here	is	with	the	specific	questions	and	tensions	that	might	be	
foreclosed	 by	 ‘criminal	 law’s	 self‐understanding’	 (Farmer	 2014)	 that	 law	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	
police	power.	We	consider	these	tensions	in	the	final	part	of	this	article.	
	
Political	contexts		
NSW	is	no	stranger	to	hyper‐legislative	activity,	with	the	constant	production	of	criminal	law	and	
police	powers	underpinned	by	an	enduring	penal/law	and	order	populism	(see	Hogg	and	Brown	
1998).	 Whilst	 the	 specific	 features	 of	 NSW	 law	 and	 order	 are	 relevant,	 globalised	 forms	 of	
governance	through	crime	control	also	make	this	a	characteristic	of	most	other	Australian	states,	
more	 recently	 aided	 by	 increasingly	 coordinated,	 national	 and	 transnational	 agendas	 and	
interagency	efforts	on	combating	local	and	international	organised	crime.	Since	at	least	2008,	the	
production	of	organised	crime	and	bikie	gangs	as	a	serious	threat	has	been	a	unifying	theme	in	
political	discourse	justifying	the	formal	expansion	of	criminalisation	across	Australia	nationally	
(Ayling	2011).	The	designation	of	‘declared	organisations’	and	associated	control	orders	has	been	
well	critiqued	as	eroding	fundamental	rights	and	criminal	 law	norms	in	NSW	(Cowdery	2009;	
Loughnan	2009;	McGarrity	2012).	However,	while	these	trends	around	organised	crime	are	pre‐
figured	by	an	expansive	regime	of	counter‐terrorism	laws	over	the	last	15	years	(Loughnan	2009;	
McGarrity	2012),	the	so‐called	‘pre‐emptive	turn’	has	a	longer	history.	The	rise	of	pre‐emptive	
criminalisation	targeted	to	associations	and	membership	for	threats	of	‘serious	crime’	must	be	
understood	in	the	context	of	older,	settler‐colonial	formations	of	criminalisation.		
	
Importantly,	the	over‐policing	of	Indigenous	peoples	is	testimony	to	the	racialised	foundations	of	
Australian	laws	which	have	criminalised	status	to	accomplish	dispossession,	while	maintaining	
the	 fiction	 that	 law	 criminalises	 ‘doing’	 rather	 than	 ‘being’.	 The	 practice	 of	 regulating	 and	
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punishing	 Indigenous	 peoples	 through	 public	 order	 offences—including	 offensive	 language,	
public	drunkenness	and	then	‘protective	custody’—has	been	well	documented	for	their	structural	
effects	in	disrupting	self‐determination	(Cunneen	2001).	In	these	very	material	senses	of	 ‘pre‐
emption’,	 the	 criminalisation	 of	Aboriginal	 and	Torres	 Strait	 Islander	peoples	 exemplifies	 the	
police	 power	 function	 of	 criminal	 law.	 Moreover,	 the	 indistinction	 between	 police	
powers/criminal	offences	has	been	central	to	the	specific	forms	of	punitive	regulation	enabled	by	
NSW	criminal	justice	processes.	For	example,	proactive	bail	policing	is	a	cause	of	the	increase	in	
the	 Indigenous	remand	population	 in	NSW,	one	of	 the	 fastest	growing	 in	Australia	 (Bureau	of	
Crime	Statistics	and	Research	2016:	17).	
	
The	 revival	 and	 recalibration	 of	 the	 NSW	 consorting	 laws	 through	 the	 Crimes	 Amendment	
(Consorting	 and	 Organised	 Crime)	 Act	 2012	 (NSW)	 further	 exemplified	 the	 inherent	 fusion	
between	 pre‐emption,	 police	 power	 and	 criminal	 law.	 The	 2012	 amendments1	 made	 it	 an	
indictable	offence	to	associate	with	a	convicted	offender	on	two	or	more	occasions,	regardless	of	
the	 purpose	 of	 the	 meeting	 (McNamara	 2014).	 The	 elements	 of	 the	 new	 consorting	 offence	
require	that	Police	have	warned	an	accused	that	they	have	consorted	with	a	person	who	has	been	
convicted	of	an	indictable	offence	before	a	charge	can	properly	be	made.	But,	in	practice,	the	new	
consorting	regime	has	continued	the	historical	pattern	of	consorting	being	used	as	a	police	power	
rather	than	an	offence	which	is	prosecuted	(Steel	2003),	with	9,100	warnings	issued	as	compared	
to	42	people	charged	with	46	offences	between	April	2012	and	April	2015	(NSW	Ombudsman	
2016:	3).		
	
In	justifying	the	introduction	of	both	serious	crime	prevention	orders	(SCPOs)	and	public	safety	
orders	(PSOs),	the	NSW	Minister	for	Police	claimed	they	were	part	of	a	strategy	for	building	on	
the	success	of	the	consorting	offences,	‘which	have	proved	successful	and	are	having	a	significant	
effect	 on	numerous	 crime	groups’	(Grant	2016:	78).	However,	 the	NSW	Police	are	using	 their	
consorting	 powers	 to	 target	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 ‘suspect	 populations’.	 In	 its	 2016	 review	 of	 the	
legislation,	the	NSW	Ombudsman	presented	data	that	showed	that	Police	used	consorting	powers	
disproportionately	 against	Aboriginal	peoples	 and	young	people.	The	Ombudsman	 found	also	
that	 Police	 were	 consistently	 wrong	 when	 identifying	 young	 people	 as	 ‘convicted	 offenders’,	
resulting	in	79	per	cent	of	all	consorting	warnings	being	made	in	error	(NSW	Ombudsman	2016:	
4).	The	Ombudsman	further	found	that	NSW	Police	made	a	policy	decision	to	extend	the	scope	of	
the	 provision	 to	 all	 criminal	 offences,	 instead	 of	 limiting	 it	 to	 organised	 crime	 as	 originally	
intended	by	Parliament.	Thus,	consorting	was	used	not	only	by	the	NSW	Police	Gang	Squad	and	
other	 specialist	 forces,	 but	 also	 by	 general	 duties	 officers.	 Where	 consorting	 warnings	 were	
issued	by	general	duty	officers,	44	per	cent	of	the	people	targeted	by	general	duty	officers	were	
Aboriginal,	compared	to	13	per	cent	of	those	targeted	by	specialist	squads	(NSW	Ombudsman	
2016:	4).	
	
The	Ombudsman’s	review	made	20	recommendations,	13	of	which	focused	on	amending	the	NSW	
Police	Force’s	policies	and	procedures.	In	taking	this	approach,	the	recommendations	sought	to	
regulate	and	fine‐tune	the	use	of	consorting	rather	than	challenge	the	conceptual	basis	for	the	
offence	and	the	premises	it	shares	with	the	police	power	model	of	the	criminal	law.	Indeed,	the	
report	argued	that	the	consorting	laws	had	been	used	to	‘disrupt	serious	and	organised	crime’	
and	 that	 the	 amendments	were	 necessary	 ‘to	mitigate	 the	 unintended	 impacts	 of	 [the	 law’s]	
operation’	(NSW	Ombudsman	2016:	iii).	In	effect,	the	recommendations	did	little	to	de‐legitimise	
the	 use	 of	 the	 consorting	 offence	 or	 to	 challenge	 the	 significant	 political	 lobby	 for	 and	 trend	
towards	the	expansion	of	formal	police	powers	in	NSW.	In	recent	years,	this	trend	has	included:	
the	erosion	of	the	right	to	silence	(Dixon	and	Cowdery	2013);	the	expansion	of	the	law	of	arrest	
enabling	its	proactive	use	for	the	purpose	of	preventing	crime	(Sentas	and	McMahon	2014);	and	
the	systematic	use	of	a	statutory	DNA	‘back‐capture’	scheme	to	target,	in	the	absence	of	suspicion	
or	investigation,	previously	untested	former	offenders	(Crimes	(Forensic	Procedures)	Amendment	
Act	2008	(NSW)).	
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There	 are	 significant	 institutional	 drivers	 towards	 this	 expansion	 of	 police	 powers.	 The	
integration	of	broader	business	and	development	 interests	 into	NSW	government	agendas	 for	
infrastructure,	roads,	local	council	governance	and	coal	seam	gas	mining	has	underpinned	some	
of	the	new	criminal	laws,	especially	in	relation	to	protests	(see	below).	Police	power	has	also	been	
central	to	this	process.	The	historic,	well	documented	power	of	both	the	NSW	Police	Association	
and	 the	 NSW	 Police	 Force	 as	 political	 actors	 shaping	 NSW	 criminal	 law	 (Finnane	 2000)	was	
manifest	in	the	April	2014	amalgamation	of	the	Attorney	General’s	and	Justice	Department	with	
the	 Police	 and	 Emergency	 Services	 portfolio	 into	 a	 single	 ‘Police	 and	 Justice’	 cluster.	 The	
reshuffling	of	the	new	Minister	for	Justice	and	Police	as	senior	to	the	Attorney	General	arguably	
‘either	allowed	or	 created	 the	perception	of	police	 interests	 setting	 the	priorities	 for	 criminal	
justice	policy	in	this	State’	(NSW	Bar	Association	and	Law	Society	of	NSW	2016).	Moreover,	an	
already	weak	police	accountability	framework	was	further	eroded	in	2016	by	the	amalgamation	
of	the	police	division	of	the	NSW	Ombudsman	and	the	Police	Integrity	Commission	into	one	single	
body,	the	Law	Enforcement	Conduct	Commission.	This	decision	followed	a	recommendation	by	
the	Tink	 (2015)	Review	of	Police	Oversight,	which	was	 advocated	 strongly	 by	 the	NSW	Police	
Association	and	aimed	strategically	at	weakening	the	power	of	the	Police	Integrity	Commission	
(Police	Association	of	NSW	2014).	The	review	rejected	options	for	civilian	investigation	of	police	
complaints	 or	 greater	 power	 for	 oversight	 bodies	 to	 make	 recommendations	 that	 bind	 the	
Commissioner	of	Police	(Tink	2015).		
	
In	sum,	there	is	a	longstanding	context	in	NSW	of	policing	strategies	(the	incorporation	of	risk,	
pre‐emption	and	punitive	coercive	measures)	that	are	associated	with	the	police	power	function	
of	 the	criminal	 law.	This	provides	 the	 framework	for	discussing	the	 four	pre‐emptive	regimes	
outlined	below.	
	
Four	new	pre‐emptive	criminal	regimes:	An	overview	
Serious	crime	prevention	orders	
The	Crimes	(Serious	Crime	Prevention	Orders)	Act	2016	(SCPO	Act)	commenced	on	25	November	
2016	after	being	announced	and	introduced	into	Parliament	on	22	March	2016.	The	rationale	for	
SCPOs	is	to	‘prevent,	restrict	or	disrupt	involvement	by	certain	persons	in	serious	crime	related	
activity’	 (Grant	2016:	73‐78)	Together	with	PSOs,	 they	were	 framed	as	part	of	 the	NSW	state	
government’s	‘election	commitment	to	introduce	tough	new	powers	to	give	Police	the	upper	hand	
in	the	fight	against	serious	crime’	(Grant	2016:	73‐78).	The	NSW	law	is	adapted	from	the	United	
Kingdom’s	 Serious	 Crime	 Orders	 introduced	 in	 2007	 (Methven	 and	 Carter	 2016)	 and,	 more	
broadly,	forms	part	of	a	national	approach	to	organised	crime	first	set	out	by	the	Commonwealth	
Organised	Crime	Strategic	Framework	in	2009	(Australian	Government	2009).	
	
The	SCPO	Act	enables	the	Commissioner	of	Police,	the	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	(DPP)	or	
the	New	South	Wales	Crime	Commission	to	apply	for	court	orders2	restricting	the	activity	of	a	
suspect,	based	on	allegations	of	involvement	in	criminal	activity,	or	as	a	post‐conviction	control.	
The	 court	 has	 an	 open‐ended	 power	 to	 impose	 whatever	 prohibitions,	 restrictions	 or	
requirements	it	thinks	will	prevent,	restrict	or	disrupt	the	person.	For	example,	orders	can	ban	
the	suspect	from	types	of	locations,	restrict	their	movements	and	subject	them	to	ongoing	curfews	
for	up	to	five	years.	A	breach	of	the	order	carries	a	maximum	penalty	of	five	years’	imprisonment.	
	
These	 orders	 are	 determined	 on	 the	 balance	 of	 probabilities	 and	 can	be	 applied	without	 any	
evidence	that	the	suspect	has	committed	a	crime,	and	in	a	wide	range	of	circumstances.	SCPOs	
represent	the	most	extensive	form	of	supervisory	order	now	available	and	are	substantially	more	
expansive	than	existing	control	order	schemes,	both	in	terms	of	the	target	population	and	the	
scope	of	the	order.		
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Public	safety	orders	
The	Criminal	Legislation	Amendment	(Organised	Crime	and	Public	Safety)	Act	2016	 (NSW)	was	
introduced	at	 the	same	 time	as	 the	SCPO	 legislation	and	commenced	on	31	March	2017.	Like	
SCPOs,	PSOs	were	justified	by	government	as	necessary	to	combat	organised	crime	and	‘disrupt	
the	activities	of	serious	criminals’,	to	‘prevent	people	from	going	to	certain	places’	(Grant	2016:	
73).	The	Act	introduced	a	range	of	measures	including	strengthening	forfeiture	of	property	from	
the	proceeds	of	crime.	Our	focus	here	is	with	the	new	PSO	regime	introduced	into	Part	6B	LEPRA	
2002	(NSW),	and	modelled	on	similar	provisions	in	South	Australia.	PSOs	can	be	made	by	a	senior	
police	officer,	 if	they	believe	that	the	presence	of	a	particular	person	(or	class	of	persons)	at	a	
public	event,	area	or	other	premise	poses	a	‘serious	risk	to	public	safety	or	security’	and	if	Police	
believe	the	order	is	‘reasonably	necessary’	to	mitigate	the	risk.	Police	may	make	the	order	for	up	
to	72	hours	but,	in	practice,	it	may	be	for	much	longer	as	it	can	be	for	the	duration	of	an	event,	
including	multiple	evenings	covering	the	same	event.	As	with	the	SCPO,	contravention	of	a	PSO	
attracts	up	to	five	years’	imprisonment.		
	
Investigative	detention	
Enacted	on	16	May	2016,	the	Terrorism	(Police	Powers)	Amendment	(Investigative	Detention)	Act	
2016	(NSW)	amended	the	Terrorism	(Police	Powers)	Act	2002	(NSW)	to	extend	the	existing	regime	
of	detention	without	charge,	in	two	ways.	First,	NSW	Police	may	now	arrest	a	terrorism	suspect	
as	young	as	14	years	of	age	(previously	over	16	years	of	age)	for	the	purpose	of	preventative,	
‘investigative	 detention’.	 That	 is,	 arrest	 and	 detention	 are	 not	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 charging	
someone	suspected	of	having	committed	a	crime,	but	for	investigation/prevention	of	crimes	that	
have	 not	 occurred.	Whereas	previously	 only	 the	 Supreme	Court	 could	 authorise	 preventative	
detention,	NSW	Police	are	now	empowered	to	detain	a	person	for	up	to	four	days	and	may	apply	
to	an	eligible	 judge	by	telephone	to	extend	the	detention	period	to	up	to	14	days.	During	that	
period,	all	contact	the	detained	person	has	with	others	(excluding	legal	advice)	is	monitored	and	
contact	with	specified	persons,	including	family	members	and	the	detained	person’s	lawyer,	can	
be	prohibited	in	the	detention	warrant.	Second,	the	Act	now	permits	police	questioning	of	the	
suspect	for	periods	of	16	hours	or	more	at	a	time.	
	
These	extensions	to	the	police	power	in	NSW	were	subsequently	incorporated	into	the	model	for	
a	national	approach	to	counter‐terrorism	agreed	at	a	special	meeting	of	the	Council	of	Australian	
Governments	 (COAG)	 in	October	 2017.	While,	 at	 the	 time	of	writing,	 the	 Commonwealth	 and	
states	have	not	yet	drafted	legislation,	the	agreement	included	the	extension	of	the	police	power	
of	investigative	detention	for	up	to	14	days,	through	expanding	the	target	population	from	those	
14	years	of	age	and	older	to	10	years	of	age	and	older	(COAG	2017).	
	
In	NSW,	these	new	police	powers	were	framed	as	a	necessary	preventive	response	to	an	evolving,	
younger,	terrorist	threat	and	justified	as	rectifying	‘operational	gaps’	in	the	existing	preventative	
detention	 regimes,	 namely,	 that	 criminal	 intelligence	 relied	 upon	 by	 police	 for	 detention	
applications	were	scrutinised	by	the	court	and	made	available	(albeit	redacted	and	partial)	to	the	
defence	(Baird	2016:	52‐53).	The	implications	of	the	use	of	police	intelligence	as	untested	and	
secret	evidence	across	the	new	laws	is	discussed	below.	
	
Anti‐protest	laws	
The	Inclosed	Lands,	Crime	and	Law	Enforcement	Legislation	Amendment	(Interference)	Act	2016	
(NSW)3	was	introduced	to	restrict	‘risky	protest	activities’	at	coal	seam	gas	and	other	mining	sites,	
and	major	roads	construction	sites	such	as	Sydney’s	WestConnex	project.4	While	framed	in	terms	
of	personal	risk,	the	government	was	clearly	concerned	to	protect	commercial	interests.	The	NSW	
Minister	 for	 Industry,	 Resources	 and	 Energy	 stated	 the	 legislation	 was	 designed	 ‘to	 create	 a	
deterrent	 to	 illegal	 behavior	 by	 protestors’,	 complained	 of	 the	 costs	 to	 business	 caused	 by	
protestors	locking	themselves	into	access	gates	and	erecting	structures	that	obstructed	access	to	
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mine	sites,	and	cited	six	cases	where	mining	operations	were	halted	as	a	result	(Roberts	2016:	
7012‐7014,	7029‐7031).		
	
The	Act	created	a	new	offence	of	‘aggravated	unlawful	entry’	if	a	person	interferes	with	or	intends	
or	attempts	to	interfere	with	the	conduct	of	a	business.	Alternatively,	it	is	an	offence	if	a	person	
does	anything	that	gives	rise	to	a	‘serious	risk	to	safety’.	Rather	than	the	maximum	fine	of	$500	
attaching	 to	 trespass,	 the	 aggravated	 offence	 attracts	 a	 $5,500	 maximum	 fine.	 The	 Act	 also	
expands	the	offence	of	intentionally	or	recklessly	‘interfering’	with	a	mine	to	include	hindering	
the	work	of	any	equipment	associated	with	the	mine,	which	carries	a	penalty	of	up	to	seven	years'	
imprisonment.		
	
The	Act	gives	NSW	Police	additional	powers	of	search	and	seizure	without	warrant	if	there	are	
reasonable	grounds	 to	suspect	a	person	has	 items	to	be	used	to	 lock	on	to	a	structure	 for	 the	
purpose	of	interfering	with	the	conduct	of	a	business	or	that	will	be	used	in	a	way	that	is	a	serious	
risk	 to	 safety.	 It	 also	undermined	 the	 longstanding	prohibition	 in	LEPRA	2002	 (NSW)	against	
Police	giving	move‐on	directions	to	protestors.	Now	Police	may	give	directions	to	protestors	if	
the	 officer	 believes	 there	 is	 a	 ‘safety	 risk’.	 Police	 are	 additionally	 empowered	 to	 move‐on	
protestors	 if	 obstructing	 traffic	 and	 if	 either	 not	 an	 authorised	 public	 assembly	 under	 the	
Summary	Offences	Act	1988	(NSW)	or	not	substantially	in	accordance	with	an	authorisation	given.	
Failure	to	abide	by	these	directions	will	result	in	a	criminal	offence,	punishable	by	a	fine	of	up	to	
$220.		
	
Criminal	law	as	police	power:	Four	features		
This	section	considers	the	combined	effects	of	the	new	criminal	law	regimes	to	identify	as	police	
power	their	four	distinct	features:	i)	the	expansion	of	the	target	population;	ii)	the	expansion	of	
the	 harms	 to	 be	 intervened	 against;	 iii)	 the	 transfer	 of	 judicial	 to	 police	 power,	 and;	 iv)	 the	
extended	mimicry	between	‘legal’	and	‘policing’	forms	of	control.		
	
i) Expansion	of	target	populations	
The	new	criminal	laws	incorporate	expansive	categories	defining	new	classes	of	suspects	subject	
to	police	power.	These	laws	widen	the	population	targeted	for	criminalisation	by	formalising	a	
policing	concept	of	‘the	suspect’	that	is	drawn	from	institutional	police	practices.	Pre‐emption	is	
embedded	as	a	primary	rationale	for	these	practices,	and	is	justified	typically	by	an	elastic	notion	
of	 potential	 serious	 criminality	 that	 blurs	 conventional	 distinctions	 between	 summary	 and	
indictable	offences,	 serious	and	 less	 serious	offences,	 and	 so	on.	 Ideologically,	 these	practices	
conflate	what	the	public	might	associate	with	‘serious	crime’—for	example,	murder	or	significant	
violence—with	a	much	wider	range	of	offending.	Thus,	a	SCPO	can	be	made	against	a	person	who	
has	been	convicted	of	a	‘serious	crime’,	which	is	defined	as	any	offence	subject	to	five	years	or	
more	of	imprisonment.	This	subjects	most	offences	in	the	Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW)	and	many	of	
the	offences	of	 the	Drugs	Misuse	and	Trafficking	Act	1985	 (NSW)	 to	pre‐emption.	As	 a	 result,	
offences	 such	 as	 shoplifting	 (larceny),	 rock	 throwing,	 riot	 and	 affray,	 and	 possession	 and	
cultivation	of	a	prohibited	plant	sit	in	the	same	category	for	targeting.	
	
Moreover,	extending	Dubber’s	concept	of	the	‘offenderless	offence’,	a	SCPO	can	be	issued	against	
a	person	who	has	not	been	charged	with	an	offence	or	who	has	been	acquitted.	This	illustrates	
how	the	target	populations	of	this	legislation	are	those	of	whom	the	Police	are	suspicious	without	
having	sufficient	evidence	to	charge	them	with	an	offence.	 In	this	way,	the	 legal	subject	of	the	
order	 is	 the	 same	 as	 the	 low	 threshold	 police	 category	 of	 the	 ‘person	 of	 interest’.	 The	 police	
suspect	is	assembled	from	the	entire	range	of	proxies	for	guilt	that	are	available	to	Police	(being	
known	to	Police;	prior	offending	history;	and	associations,	imputed	or	real).	Accordingly,	through	
SCPO,	criminal	law	formally	incorporates	and	expands	the	policing	concept	of	the	suspect	as	the	
basis	for	punitive	control.	Not	only	is	the	suspect	defined	legally	prior	to	evidence	of	a	prima	facie	
case,	or	after	an	acquittal,	the	targets	of	SCPO	are	those	whom	the	Police	decide	are	suspicious.		
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Lastly,	 a	 person	may	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 SCPO	 if	 ‘involved	 in	 serious	 crime	 related	 activity’.	 This	
includes	facilitating	another	person’s	engagement	in	a	serious	crime,	or	the	likelihood	the	person	
may	 facilitate	 another	 person’s	 engagement.	 The	 subject	 need	 not	 be	 suspected	 by	 Police	 of	
having	 engaged	 in	 serious	 crime.	 As	 with	 the	 consorting	 regime,	 the	 framing	 of	 suspicion	
justifying	police	 intervention	 is	 the	criminal	association	 identified	by	 the	Police.	Criminalising	
facilitation	 legitimises	 the	 policing	 of	 family,	 social	 and	 community	 networks	who	 the	 Police	
believe	 ought	 to	 be	 targeted—or	 can	 be	 targeted—for	 the	 purposes	 of	 constructing	 and	
controlling	a	suspect	population	(McConville	et	al.	1991:	14‐35).	
	
Critiques	of	SCPOs	have	highlighted	their	construction	as	civil	orders	attracting	criminal	penalties	
for	breaches	that	might	not	otherwise	justify	a	criminal	charge.	Methven	and	Carter,	for	example,	
argue	that	the	‘use	of	“hybrid”	civil	orders	…	not	only	evades	important	criminal	law	safeguards,	
but	it	also	undermines	central	bases	of	the	rule	of	law’	(Methven	and	Carter	2016:	234).	Prior	to	
the	legislation	being	passed,	the	NSW	Bar	Association	warned	that:	 ‘the	Bill	creates	a	very	real	
danger	of	arbitrary	and	excessive	interference	with	the	liberty	of	many	thousands	of	New	South	
Wales	citizens’	and	that	the	new	powers	‘are	extraordinarily	broad	and	unprecedented,	and	are	
not	 subject	 to	 any	 substantial	 legal	 constraints	 or	 appropriate	 judicial	 oversight’	 (NSW	 Bar	
Association	and	Law	Society	of	NSW	2016:	2).	
	
Orders	of	this	sort	plainly	do	represent	a	means	by	which	the	legal	processes	of	criminalisation	
are	extended	beyond	 the	notional	 requirement	 that	 criminality	 is	defined	by	 guilt	 of	 criminal	
offending.	However,	the	key	dynamic	for	this	legislation,	which	requires	an	interpretation	that	
goes	beyond	the	erosion	of	procedural	rule	of	law	norms,	is	the	assertion	of	police	power	as	a	
means	 of	 defining	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 criminal	 law.	 This	 is	 illustrated	 further	 by	 the	 extended	
investigative	detention	regime.	The	whole	array	of	anti‐terrorism	laws	has	been	justified	through	
discourses	of	necessity	and	risk.	However,	the	steady	replication	of	the	expanded	police	powers	
introduced	 by	 these	 laws	 (for	 example,	 extended	periods	 of	 detention	 and	 control	 orders)	 to	
cover	other	forms	of	association,	such	as	outlaw	motorcycle	gangs	and	serious	criminal	groups,	
belies	 claims	 to	 exceptionalism.	 Rather,	 ‘operational	 necessity’,	 defined	 largely	 according	 to	
opaque	 police	 requirements	 has	 become	 an	 almost	 unchallengeable	 justification	 for	 further	
powers.	
	
The	new	investigative	detention	regime	not	only	reduces	the	age	of	those	who	can	be	detained	to	
include	 children	 for	 whom	 there	 are	 specific	 procedural	 protections	 across	 other	 domains	
(including	criminal)	of	 the	 law,	but	also	removes	 from	the	process	any	judicial	scrutiny	of	 the	
evidence	or	suspicion	used	by	the	Police	to	justify	the	detention.	In	this	way,	the	Police	are	both	
extending	the	scope	of	the	targeted	population	defined	according	to	police	conceptions	of	risk	
and	 positioning	 themselves	 as	 primary	 law‐makers	 by	 exercising	 largely	 unaccountable,	
discretionary	powers	bestowed	formally	upon	them	by	a	willing	and	compliant	legislature.	
	
ii) Expansion	of	the	harm/	threat	justifying	police	intervention	
The	categories	of	‘serious	crime’,	‘serious	risk’	and	‘safety	risks’	expand	the	concept	of	harm	and	
amplify	the	threats	sought	to	be	forestalled.	Conceptually,	the	boundaries	of	such	risk	categories	
are	 fluid	and	vaguely	constructed	across	 the	new	 laws.	For	 the	Police,	 ‘serious	 risks	 to	public	
safety’	are	the	threshold	question	in	relation	to	PSOs;	‘serious	safety	risks’	to	any	person	trigger	
the	 anti‐protest	 laws;	 and	 ‘preventing	 a	 terrorist	 act’	 enables	 investigative	 detention.	 For	 the	
courts,	 the	 threshold	 for	 issuing	 a	 SCPO	 is	 the	necessity	 to	 ‘protect	 the	 public	 by	preventing,	
restricting,	disrupting’	a	person’s	involvement	in	serious	crime.	Ultimately,	the	meanings	in	law	
given	to	these	various	indicators	of	potential	harm	will	derive	from	police	interpretations,	and	
the	categories	will	be	brought	into	being	and	normalised	through	the	interaction	of	police	and	
judicial	practices.	
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The	role	of	the	Police	as	primary	definers	of	the	new	laws	does	not	mean	the	laws	lack	political	
purpose.	While	the	concept	of	‘the	public’	in	criminal	law	has	always	been	an	amorphous	cipher	
for	maintaining	social	order,	the	NSW	government’s	justifications	for	the	new	anti‐protest	laws	
removed	 any	 ambiguities.	 In	 the	 limited	 parliamentary	 debates,	 protecting	 ‘the	 public’	 was	
associated	 explicitly	 with	 protecting	 mining	 industry	 and	 business	 interests.	 Alongside	
forestalling	any	 ‘risk	to	business’,	the	concept	of	 ‘unsafe	protest	activities’	(Roberts	2016)	was	
discursively	deployed	to	reframe	the	place	of	civil	disobedience	and	protest	as	secondary	to,	and	
incompatible	with,	the	economic	safety	of	business	and	corporations.	According	to	one	prominent	
NSW	Liberal	Party	government	minister:	‘By	community	standards	there	are	some	actions	that	
should	clearly	not	be	supported.	Threatening	the	safety	of	others	and	causing	disruption	to	legal	
business	activities	are	clearly	in	that	camp’	(Roberts	2016).	
	
Police	have	always	been	primary	definers	of	 legitimate	protests,	 routinely	 intervening	against	
presumed	threats	of	violence	and	to	public	order,	including	when	protests	have	been	authorised	
under	 the	Summary	Offences	Act	1988	 (NSW).5	However,	 the	new	 laws	 undermine	 the	 Part	 4	
provisions	 and	make	Police	 ‘the	 arbiters	 of	what	makes	 a	 legitimate	protest’	 (McNamara	 and	
Quilter	 2016)	 by	 empowering	 them	 to	 move‐on	 protestors	 when	 the	 officer	 ‘believes	 on	
reasonable	grounds’	there	is	a	‘serious	risk	to	the	safety’	of	the	person	targeted	‘or	to	any	other	
person’	(s	200	Law	Enforcement	(Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	2002	(NSW)).	This	constructs	a	
new	 legal	 standard	 to	 justify	move‐on	directions	against	protestors,	 even	when	 the	protest	 is	
authorised	or	‘apparently	genuine’,	and	formalises	institutional	police	power	into	criminal	law’s	
power	to	police.	Because	‘safety	risks’	are	not	defined	in	this	legislative	scheme,	it	gives	Police	
broad	 discretion	 to	 disrupt	 protests.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 left	 to	 the	 Police	 to	 decide	 whether	 an	
authorised	protest	is	operating	‘substantially	in	accordance	with	any	…	authorisation’,	and	what	
constitutes	the	obstruction	of	traffic.	No	general	guidance,	statutory	or	otherwise,	is	provided	on	
the	right	to	protest.	This	is	despite	several	NSW	Supreme	Court	cases	establishing	that	disruption	
and	 inconvenience	 and	 even	 ‘aggravation	 and	 a	 risk	 of	 danger’	 are	 not	 grounds	 for	 refusing	
permission	 for	 staging	 a	 peaceful	 demonstration	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Commissioner	 of	 Police	 v	
Langosch	[2012]	NSWSC	499).	
	
The	police	power	to	interpret	risk	rests	in	part	on	status	and	association	as	enduring	justifications	
for	criminal	law.	In	relation	to	status,	Police	can	issue	a	PSO	if	they	are	satisfied	there	is	a	serious	
risk	 that	 the	person’s	presence	might	result	 in	death	or	serious	physical	harm	to	a	person,	or	
serious	damage	to	property.	Before	concluding	that	the	order	 is	 ‘reasonably	necessary’,	Police	
must	consider	several	matters,	including	whether	the	person	has	a	history	of	‘engaging	in	serious	
crime	related	activity’,	recalling	that	neither	charge	nor	conviction	is	required,	and	the	breadth	of	
the	definition	of	serious	crimes	(s	87R	Law	Enforcement	(Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	2002	
(NSW)).	Thus,	future	threats	attach	to	the	status	of	the	person,	making	it	possible,	for	example,	
for	a	‘bikie’	at	a	public	event	to	constitute	sufficient	basis	for	Police	to	be	satisfied	there	is	a	risk	
of	violence.		
	
In	relation	to	association,	counter‐terrorism	laws	generally	target	networks	of	people	suspected	
of	engaging	 in	terrorist	acts.	For	the	purposes	of	 investigative	detention,	a	terrorist	suspect	 is	
defined	as	someone	committing,	‘involved	in	preparing	or	planning’,	or	possessing	‘a	thing	that	is	
connected	with	 the	 commission	 of,	 or	 the	 preparation	 or	 planning	 for,	 a	 terrorist	 act’	 (s	 25B	
Terrorism	(Police	Powers)	Act	2002	(NSW)).	As	noted	above,	the	evidentiary	basis	for	detention	
cannot	 be	 tested	 substantially	 before	 a	 court.	 Rather,	 the	 Police	 are	 empowered	 to	 detain	 ‘a	
terrorism	suspect	for	investigation	into	a	past	or	future	terrorist	act	for	the	purposes	of	assisting	
in	or	 responding	 to	or	preventing	 the	 terrorist	act’	 (s	25C	Terrorism	(Police	Powers)	Act	2002	
(NSW)).	The	broad	scope	of	these	provisions,	the	secrecy	surrounding	the	detention	process,	and	
the	absence	of	any	independent	interrogation	of	the	nature	and	level	of	the	presumed	risk	mean	
that	police	assessments	of	what	constitutes	a	threat,	the	methods	deployed	to	establish	the	threat,	
and	the	extent	to	which	detention	is	used	for	purposes	such	as	intimidation	and	control,	go	largely	
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unchallenged.	This	illustrates	in	its	purest	form	the	centrality	of	police	power	to	the	constitution	
of	criminal	law	and	the	use	of	risk	as	a	key	ideological	device	for	legitimising	that	power.	
	
iii) Transfer	of	judicial	to	police	power		
In	normative	terms,	the	increased	legislative	authority	for	the	Police	to	operate	as	a	key	definer	
of	risk	elevates	institutional	police	power	over	traditional	‘judicial	power’.	On	one	reading,	the	
transfer	of	judicial	power	is	the	key,	troubling	characteristic	of	the	two	new	supervisory	orders.	
However,	we	 argue	 that	 the	 dichotomy	 of	 distinct	 categories	 of	 judicial/police	 power	 fails	 to	
capture	fully	the	operation	and	effect	of	the	policing	processes	enabled	in	the	criminal	law.	
	
PSOs	provide	a	mechanism	for	Police	 to	determine	the	basis	on	which	 targeted	 individuals	or	
groups	 can	be	present	 in	 a	public	place	 and	 engage	 in	public	 activity	 (McNamara	 and	Quilter	
2016).	 Through	 the	 PSO	 legislation,	 Police	 have	 acquired	 unconstrained,	 primary	 decision‐
making	 power	 to	make	 an	 order.	 This	 decision‐making	 power	 is	 fortified	 through	 the	 police	
capacity	to	rely	on	intelligence	rather	than	independently	scrutinised	and	tested	evidence,	and	is	
protected	further	by	the	very	limited	legal	bases	for	appeal	against	the	imposition	of	an	order.	
While	Police	must	give	reasons	for	a	PSO	to	the	person	subject	to	the	order,	they	are	not	required	
to	disclose	information	considered	to	be	criminal	intelligence	or	‘other	criminal	information’	and	
the	Commissioner	of	Police	can	apply	to	the	court	to	protect	disclosure	of	criminal	intelligence	or	
other	 criminal	 information	 used	 to	 justify	 the	 order.	An	 appeal	 to	 the	 Supreme	Court	 is	 only	
available	if	the	order	lasts	longer	than	72	hours.	Whilst	the	appeal	is	fashioned	as	a	merits	review,	
any	 such	 review	 is	 a	 severely	 circumscribed	 right	 if	 the	 asserted	 grounds	 cannot	 be	 tested.	
Procedurally	therefore,	the	PSO	legislation	formalises	a	devolution	or	transfer	of	judicial	power	
to	the	police	authority.		
	
But,	the	primary	role	of	the	Police	is	less	significant	for	its	due	process	implications	than	for	its	
reflection	of	the	sovereign,	law‐making	power	of	Police	to	presumptively	decide	on	guilt	and	mete	
out	 punishment	 as	 a	 feature	 of	 every	 day	modern	 policing	 (Neocleous	 2000).	 This	 power	 is	
reflected	by	the	police	capacity	to	identify	and	target	potential	subjects	of	the	order	and	to	shape	
and	control	the	information	that	underpins	the	decision	to	issue	the	order.	This	in	turn	enables	
Police	 to	 control	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 police	 authority	 and	 the	 subject	 of	 such	
interventionist	orders,	regardless	of	procedural	variations	and	the	formal	role	of	the	court.		
	
This	is	important	to	note	when	comparing	the	procedural	requirements	for	the	PSO	and	the	SCPO.	
While	 the	District	Court	 (post‐conviction)	or	Supreme	Court	 (no	conviction)	 issues	a	SCPO,	as	
with	the	PSO,	the	person	subject	to	the	order	is	not	provided	with	the	information	used	by	the	
Police,	DPP	or	Crime	Commission	to	ground	the	order.	The	putative	judicial	functions	required	to	
issue	 the	 SCPO	 rest	 upon	 and	 effectively	 legitimise	 the	 secrecy	 surrounding	 the	 police	
construction	 of	 evidence.	 Restricting	 access	 to	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 the	 need	 for	 the	 SCPO	 is	
asserted	effectively	shields	from	challenge	or	scrutiny	the	initial	police	designation	of	a	person	as	
a	legitimate	target	for	a	SCPO,	the	reasoning	behind	the	designation,	the	methods	used	to	obtain	
and	 formulate	 the	evidence,	and	external	political	 imperatives	such	as	a	perceived	need	to	be	
visibly	targeting	identified	‘suspect’	populations.	In	this	respect,	the	formal	judicial	decision	by	
the	court	is	not	only	in	essence	a	decision	of	police	intelligence	but	also	operates	as	criminal	laws’	
power	to	police.	
	
The	 transfer	of	 judicial	 to	police	power	and	the	 inter‐relationship	between	 judicial	and	police	
power	 illustrate	how	criminal	 law	is	constituted	 through,	and	draws	upon,	different	modes	of	
authority	 and	 power.	 Through	 these	 supervisory	 orders,	 police	 power	 is	 one,	 increasingly	
dominant,	 defining	 mode	 of	 criminal	 law.	 However,	 police	 power	 is	 not	 static.	 Police	 power	
operates	in	tension	with	judicial	power,	sometimes	appearing	to	supersede	it	(as	with	the	PSO),	
or	(as	with	the	SCPO)	relying	upon	judicial	authority	to	confer	legitimacy	within	the	orbit	of	due	
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process.	 Either	 way,	 the	 constitutive	 function	 of	 police	 power	 is	 the	 important	 dynamic	 to	
criminal	law	revealed	in	the	new	orders.	
	
iv) Criminal	 law’s	 punitiveness	 is	 exercised	 through	 control,	 confiscation,	 and	
disruption/pre‐emption	as	well	as	penalties	
The	four	legal	regimes	provide	new	and	increased	formal	powers	of	arrest,	search,	detention	and	
interrogation,	confiscation	and	forfeiture	to	Police.	Combined,	these	new	powers	reproduce	and	
embed	a	logic	of	pre‐emption	and	disruption	in	the	criminal	law.	As	noted	above,	this	reflects	the	
function	 of	 risk	 as	 a	 formative	 ideology	 of	 police	 power.	 It	 also	 confirms	 Dubber’s	 insight	
regarding	status	and	character	offences	that	‘the	object	of	police	governance	through	the	criminal	
process	is	the	threat,	not	the	offender’	(Dubber	2006:	135).		
	
Being	 given	 legal	 authority	 to	 intervene	 directly	 against	 a	 designated	 risk	 enables	 Police	 to	
ground	criminality	in	a	state	of	being	or	surrounding	circumstance	dissociated	from	the	minimum	
expectations	of	 individual	agency	 inscribed	 in	criminal	 law	through	the	requirement	 for	actus	
reus	 and	 mens	 rea.	 Through	 pre‐emption	 and	 disruption	 strategies,	 Police	 are	 able	 to	
institutionalise	the	criminalisation	of	target	groups,	extend	police	powers	and	expand	the	scope	
of	criminal	law.	
	
For	example,	investigative	detention	extends	the	police	power	of	arrest	to	a	person	who	has	not	
yet	 committed	an	offence.	The	broad	definition	of	 the	 ‘terrorism	suspect’	 and	 the	unspecified	
nature	 of	 the	 future	 terrorist	 act	 enable	 arrests	 and	 prolonged	 detention	 as	 core	 operational	
strategies.	 The	 provisions	 explicitly	 create	 a	 pre‐emptive	 arrest	 power	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
incapacitation	or	disruption	insofar	as	they	are	 ‘responding	to	or	preventing	the	terrorist	act’.	
This	lowers	the	common	law	threshold	(reflected	in	other	statutory	arrest	powers	such	as	s	99(3)	
LEPRA	2002	(NSW))	that	an	arrest	must	be	necessary	for	the	purpose	of	initiating	proceedings	
against	 a	 suspect,	 and	 normalises	 the	 use	 of	 arrest	 primarily	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 intelligence	
gathering.	
	
Similarly,	 some	of	 the	new	offences	are	designed	 to	 function	as	police	power	 (Dixon	1997)	 in	
much	 the	 same	 way	 as	 the	 offence	 of	 consorting	 (Steel	 2003).	 For	 example,	 the	 offence	 of	
aggravated	 unlawful	 entry	 threatens	 a	 serious	 sanction	 against	 refusal	 to	move‐on	 or	 vacate	
property	in	protest	situations.	Combined	with	the	extended	move‐on	powers	in	s	200	LEPRA	2002	
(NSW),	 the	 ‘reasonable	 force’	 allowable	when	exercising	 the	 arrest	 power	 against	 individuals	
deemed	by	Police	to	be	 interfering	or	 intending	to	interfere	with	a	business	or	representing	a	
serious	risk	to	personal	safety	inevitably	will	involve	groups	of	heavily	armed	Police	moving	into	
and	 disrupting	 protests	 in	 circumstances	 where	 the	 putative	 risk	 posed	 by	 an	 individual	 is	
attributed	to	the	collective	whole.	
	
Finally,	police	power	is	extended	through	the	imposition	of	criminal	sanctions	for	breaches	of	the	
new	 interventionist	 orders.	 Resisting	 the	 exercise	 of	 police	 powers	 is	 already	 criminalised	 in	
other	contexts,	notably	the	refusal	to	comply	with	move‐on	directions	(s	199	LEPRA	2002	(NSW);	
s	 9	Summary	Offences	Act	1988	 (NSW)).	However,	 the	potential	 prohibitions,	 restrictions	 and	
other	 requirements	 that	 can	 be	 imposed	 under	 a	 SCPO	 are	 broadly	 defined	 and	 attach	 to	 a	
potentially	wide	range	of	police	powers	that	make	breaches	relatively	easy	to	enforce.	While	the	
SCPO	is	fundamentally	a	control	order	in	that	it	regulates	a	perceived	risk,	its	monitoring	fits	into	
a	 wider	 web	 of	 police	 surveillance	 practices,	 such	 as	 bail	 compliance	 checking	 and	 Suspect	
Targeting	Management	 Plans	 (Sentas	 and	 Pandolfini	 2017).	 The	 fact	 that	 a	 SCPO	 is	 imposed	
through	civil	proceedings	that	escalate	to	criminal	proceedings	if	the	order	is	breached	indicates	
both	 the	 punitive	 consequences	 of	 non‐compliance	with	 police	 operational	 decisions	 and	 the	
centrality	of	police	powers	to	the	construction	of	criminality.	
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Conclusion:	The	police	powers	function	of	the	criminal	law		
Most	studies	of	pre‐emption	analyse	 it	 in	 isolation	 from	the	police	power,	which	 is	posited	as	
related	to	but	separate	from	the	criminal	law.	In	this	register,	the	pre‐emptive	turn	reflects	the	
law’s	 colonisation	 by	 expansive	 imperatives	 of	 risk	 prevention.	 However,	 as	 Farmer	 (2014)	
argues,	 the	 criminal	 law’s	 ‘self‐understanding’	 that	 it	 is	 not	 police	 power	 and	 not	 a	mode	 of	
security	governance,	necessarily	limits	analyses	that	focus	on	criminal	law’s	primary	function	of	
securing	social	order:		
	
The	alignment	of	law	with	liberty	against	security	has	prevented	more	systematic	
investigation	 of	 the	 question	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 criminal	 law	 can	 itself	 be	
conceived	of	as	a	security	project	or	the	extent	to	which	law	enables	or	buttresses	
a	larger	security	project.	This	is	not	just	a	matter	of	detailing	the	specific	references	
to	security	in	the	criminal	law—for	instance	in	recent	anti‐terrorism	legislation—
but	 of	 reconstructing	 in	 a	 more	 general	 sense	 how	 the	 criminal	 law	 has	
contributed,	 and	 has	 seen	 itself	 as	 contributing,	 to	 the	 securing	 of	 social	 order	
[emphasis	added].	(Farmer	2014:	399)	
	
Taking	the	centrality	of	maintaining	order	to	the	construction	of	criminal	law	and	the	operation	
of	law	as	an	expression	of	the	police	power	as	our	points	of	reference,	we	have	argued	that	recent	
criminal	law	reform	in	NSW	exemplifies	four	features	of	criminal	law	that	are	productive	of	its	
police	power.	These	are	an	expansion	of	the	target	populations	subjected	to	police	supervisory	
control;	the	amplification	of	the	risks	or	threats	imagined	to	be	intervened	into	to	include	threats	
to	business	and	low	thresholds	justifying	intervention;	the	transfer	of	judicial	to	police	power;	
and	the	expansion	of	punitive	strategies	of	control	and	confiscation.	
	
Combined,	these	four	features	indicate	policing	social	order	in	NSW	does	not	operate	in	isolation	
from	 or	 alien	 to	 criminal	 law	 but	 as	 one	 essential	 part	 of	 its	 operative	 logic(s).	 Ideological	
commitments	to	due	process	and	‘the	legal’	as	bulwarks	against	state	power	can	legitimise	and	
amplify	criminal	law’s	police	power	to	expansively	define	and	capture	its	targets.	This	is	not	to	
suggest	there	are	not	important	limit	points	in	the	legal	form	of	criminal	law’s	power	to	police.	
Rather,	it	is	significant	that	the	objects	of	crime/security	are	distinctly	neither	the	proper	subjects	
of	police	power	nor	criminal	law	alone.	Moreover,	we	see	a	specific	production	of	pre‐emptive	
criminal	law	from	the	perspective	of	its	police	power,	rather	than	starting	and	ending	with	the	
assumed	autonomy	of	the	criminal	law.	In	combination,	these	four	new	regimes	reflect	the	state’s	
concern	with	protecting	its	interests	through	a	range	of	inter‐related	strategies	based	on	different	
modes	 of	 authority	 and	 power.	 In	 the	 current	 period,	 police	 power	 is	 a	 dominant	 driver	 of	
criminal	law.	Pushing	back	against	the	developments	we	have	discussed	involves	analysing	and	
challenging	the	ways	in	which	police	power	is	constituted	and	exercised	through	criminal	law.	
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1	Now	contained	in	s	93X	Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW).	
2	District	or	supreme	court,	depending	on	the	category	of	suspect.	
3	 The	 provisions	 of	 the	 Act	 relating	 to	 aggravated	 trespass,	 interfering	with	 a	mine,	 commenced	 on	 1	 June	 2016.	
Provisions	relating	to	police	powers	commenced	on	1	November	2016.	
4	 There	 has	 been	 considerable	 opposition	 to	 coal	 seam	 gas	 operations	 in	 New	 South	 Wales.	 See,	 for	 example,	
http://www.lockthegate.org.au/.	WestConnex	is	a	major	motorway	project	being	built	in	the	densely	populated	inner	
western	suburbs	of	Sydney.	It	has	provoked	considerable	opposition	from	resident	groups	and	others.		
			See	https://www.westconnex.com.au/;	and	http://www.westconnexactiongroup.org.au/.		
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5	See,	for	example,	Commissioner	of	Police	v	Rintoul	[2003]	NSWSC	662.	Despite	authorisation	from	the	NSW	Supreme	
Court	allowing	a	protest	outside	 the	vacant	home	of	 then	Federal	 Immigration	Minister,	Philip	Ruddock,	and	 the	
demonstration	being	peaceful,	police	prevented	demonstrators	gaining	access	 to	 the	street	where	 the	house	was	
located.	Although	the	police	refused	to	give	reasons	for	their	actions	at	the	time,	it	was	later	reported	they	did	so	to	
prevent	a	‘disturbance’.	
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